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Faced with the difficulty of reconciling the tensions between the need for treatment, 
and respecting patients’ rights, case law suggests that the courts in Ireland have 
tended to maintain a deferential approach to the medical profession and not to give 
voice to the significant rights protections set out in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and instead view the legislation in this area, the 
Mental Health Act 2001 through a paternalistic prism.2 This has given rise to what 
seems at first glance to be the extraordinary logic in what is now the leading, and 
only, Irish Supreme Court case in the area, E.H. v Clinical Director St Vincent’s 
Hospital.3 This case states that a voluntary patient is not a voluntary patient in so far 
as one ordinarily understands the word. In the Supreme Court, Kearns J, said:  
 
‘The terminology adopted in s.2 of the Act ascribes a very particular meaning to the term 
‘voluntary patient’. It does not describe such a person as one who freely and voluntarily gives 
consent to an admission order.’4  
 
This suggests an interpretation of the 2001 Act which is not immediately reconcilable 
with the considerable body of jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
II. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND WINTERWERP5 
 
Mindful of illegal incarcerations that took place in the Second World War, the 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (‘ECHR’) states, and echoes the Irish 
Constitution in this regard, that no one shall be deprived of their liberty save in 
accordance with law, 6 and that anybody so deprived has the right to have that 
detention reviewed.7 Article 5(4) of the Convention states that: ‘Everyone who is 
*PhD candidate in Law at the University of Limerick  
1 The term ‘voluntary’ is used in the Irish Mental Health Act 2001 whilst the term ‘informal’ is used in 
the Mental Health Act 1983 in England and Wales. As Eldergill observes, the wording in s2 and s 29 
of the Mental Health Act 2001 suggests that what is meant by voluntary admission in an Irish context 
is in fact informal admission as there is no requirement under the Irish legislation to have capacity to 
‘volunteer’ for admission, as would be the case in most jurisdictions. A. Eldergill, ‘The Best is the 
Enemy of The Good: The Mental Health Act 2001’ (2008) J. Mental Health L. 21, p26. 
2 The Department of Health Expert Group reports growing concern at the ‘paternalistic approach that 
has been adopted by the judiciary in the interpretation of the Act’. Department of Health Report of the 
Expert Group on the Review of the Mental Health Act 2001, (2015), p12.  
3 [2009] ILRM 149 
4 EH v Clinical Director St Vincent’s Hospital [2009] 2 ILRM 149, at 161 
5 Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 
6 ECHR 1950, Art 5 (1) and Article 40.4 1 Bunreacht na hEireann 1937 
7 Article 5(4) ECHR. However, as Richardson observes, ’Certain groups of unsightly people can 
simply be detained’. G. Richardson, ‘The European Convention and Mental Health Law in England 
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deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by 
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his 
release ordered if the detention is not lawful’.8  
 
The seminal case of Winterwerp v The Netherlands9 in 1979 sets out how these 
provisions are to be applied viz-à-viz the detention of mental health patients, namely: 
(1) the person must be shown to be of unsound mind;10 (2) the mental disorder must 
be of a degree or kind warranting involuntary confinement; and (3) the detention 
remains compatible with Article 5 only so long as the disorder persists.11 How the 
review of detention procedures were to be interpreted was not, however, set out in 
the case. 
 
III. CROKE V SMITH (NO 2)12 
 
In the Irish case of Croke v Smith (No 2),13 a challenge was brought to the provisions 
of the Mental Treatment Act 1945, the precursor to the Mental Health Act 2001, 
which allowed for indefinite and unchecked detention. While Budd J in the High 
Court 14  acknowledged the ECHR’s ‘persuasive influence’, 15  he found that a 
chargeable patient reception order ‘which allows for detention until removal or 
discharge by proper authority or death, without any automatic independent review, 
falls below the norms required by the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty.’16 
The Supreme Court subsequently 17  failed to acknowledge the ECHR or the 
principles set out in Winterwerp.18 It was satisfied that an ordinary review during the 
course of medical care would constitute a sufficient guarantee of personal liberty.  
and Wales: Moving Beyond Process?’ (2005) 28 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 127, 
130.  
8 In X v United Kingdom (1981), (Application no. 7215/75)at para 33, the ECtHR found ‘that Article 5 
par. 4 (art. 5-4) had been violated, since X had not been entitled to take proceedings by which the 
lawfulness of his detention consequent upon his recall to hospital could be decided speedily by a 
court.’  
9Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387  
10 ‘The Convention does not state what is to be understood by the words “persons of unsound mind”. 
This term is not one that can be given definitive interpretation…, it is a term whose meaning is 
continually evolving as research in psychiatry progresses, an increasing flexibility in treatment is 
developing and society’s attitude to mental illness changes….’ Ibid., para 37. 
11 Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387, para 402  
12 Budd J. July 27 and 31, 1995; Supreme Court, July 31, 1996: [1998] 1 IR 101 
13 Budd J. July 27 and 31, 1995; Supreme Court, July 31, 1996: [1998] 1 IR 101 
14 Croke v Smith (No 2) [1995] IEHC 6 (31st July 1995) 
15 Ibid. ‘While we remain an ultra-dualist State constitutionally, the challenges of giving further effect to 
international human rights law in domestic courts are significant’ D. O'Connell, ‘Time to start taking 
European Convention on Human Rights more seriously’ http://www.irishtimes.com/news 2nd 
September 2013(date accessed 12th of September 2016) 
16 Croke v Smith (No 2) [1995] IEHC 6 (31st July 1995) See also Costello P in R.T. v. The Director of 
the Central Mental Hospital [1995] 2 IR 65, at 79 ‘So, it seems to me that the constitutional imperative 
to which I have referred requires the Oireachtas to be particularly astute when depriving persons 
suffering from mental disorder of their liberty and that it should ensure that such legislation should 
contain adequate safeguards against abuse and error in the interests of those whose welfare the 
legislation is designed to support. And in considering such safeguards regard should be had to the 
standards set by the Recommendations and Conventions of International Organisations of which this 
country is a member.’  
17 Croke v Smith (No 2) [1998] 1 IR 101 
18 Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 
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Mr Croke took his case to the European Court of Human Rights and while the Irish 
government then sought to rely on the remedy of habeas corpus19 to satisfy the 
‘detention shall be decided speedily by a court’ requirement, as set out in Article 
5(4),20 a ‘friendly settlement’ was ultimately agreed between the parties. The ensuing 
legislation, the Mental Health Act, was enacted in 2001. The key features of it were 
that it enabled independent review tribunals 21  for those formally detained and 
second-opinion safeguards for certain treatments in the absence of consent.22 
 
IV. DE FACTO DETENTION 
 
A. H.L. v U.K.23 
 
The problem persisted, however, for those psychiatric patients who were not formally 
detained, classed as ‘informal’ in England and ‘voluntary’ in Ireland.24 These patients 
appeared to be going under the radar, and in the case of H.L. v United Kingdom in 
2005 the ECHR found: 
 
‘striking the lack of any fixed procedural rules by which the admission and detention of 
compliant incapacitated persons 25 is conducted. The contrast between this dearth of regulation 
and extensive network of safeguards applicable to psychiatric committals covered by the 
[Mental Health Act] 1983 is, in the Court’s view, significant.’26  
 
Further, it found that the absence of any procedural safeguards failed to protect 
against arbitrary deprivations of liberty and therefore violated Article 5(1) of the 
ECHR.27 This has led to the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards28 in England and 
Wales which extend the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to cover the 
deprivation of liberty of, amongst others, (compliant) incapacitated mental health 
patients. In Ireland, the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 has recently 
been enacted, although is not yet operative, and safeguards in relation to deprivation 
of liberty are to be dealt with in the Disability Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 
which is currently being drafted. 
19 Article 40.4.2 Bunreacht na hEireann 1937. Roundly criticised by commentators as an ineffective 
remedy, see M.Keys ‘Challenging the lawfulness of psychiatric detention under habeas corpus in 
Ireland’ (2002) 24 D.U.L.J. 26 and C.Murray, ‘Safeguarding the Right to Liberty of Incapable 
Compliant Patients with a Mental Disorder in Ireland’ (2007) 1 Dublin University Law Journal 279 and 
ruled on by the ECHR in X v United Kingdom (7215/750) [1981] ECHR 6  
20 Article 5(4) ECHR 
21 s 17 Mental Health Act 2001 
22 s 60 Mental Health Act 2001 
23 H.L. v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32 
24 See n1 above. 
25 Though whether HL was compliant is questionable. As Lady Hale has observed, ‘L would clearly 
have objected to his admission to hospital had he not been sedated in order to get him there’ B. Hale 
‘Taking Stock’, (2009) J Mental Health L. 111, p113. 
26 H.L. v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32, para 120 
27 Ibid.,para 124 
28 Introduced into Mental Capacity Act 2005 via s 50 of the Mental Health Act 2007. It must be noted 
that these safeguards are not without their critics. See P. Fennell, ‘The Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards in England: The Case for Abolition’ (2012), Centre for Disability Law and Policy, NUIG; L. 
Series, ‘Case Study: the Limits of the Functional Approach in the English Mental Capacity Act 2005’, 
(2013), Centre for Disability Law and Policy, NUIG; and House of Lords, Select Committee on the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, ‘Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny’, March 2014.  
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On the facts of the case in H.L. v United Kingdom, H.L. did not attempt to leave the 
institution in which he was detained, but in Storck v Germany29 the Court found that 
a person who attempts to leave an institution and is prevented from doing so cannot 
be regarded as someone who validly consents to admission, irrespective of status or 
capacity30. What is interesting about the ruling in Storck, is that it ‘provides the basis 
for an approach to decision-making that looks beyond questions of capacity and 
incapacity and addresses issues of willingness, restraint and force.’31 In the 2008 
case of Shtukaturov v. Russia32 the ECtHR found, effectively reinforcing Storck: 
 
‘that while the applicant lacked de jure legal capacity to decide for himself’ that this did not 
‘necessarily mean that the applicant was de facto unable to understand his situation.’33  
 
This is very pertinent to the Irish case which is next discussed.  
 
B. E.H. v Clinical Director of St Vincent’s Hospital34 
 
In E.H. v Clinical Director of St Vincent’s Hospital the applicant sought a declaration 
that the definition of a voluntary patient under the 2001 Act was incompatible with 
Article 5 of the ECHR. This was on the basis that it was recorded on the applicant’s 
form that she did not have the capacity to consent to admission on a voluntary basis 
(upon revocation of her involuntary detention order) and yet she was admitted as a 
voluntary patient notwithstanding. This has led to the by now well-known dictum in 
Ireland:  
 
‘The terminology adopted in s.2 of the Act ascribes a very particular meaning to the term 
‘voluntary patient’. It does not describe such a person as one who freely and voluntarily gives 
consent to an admission order. 35 Instead the express statutory language defines a “voluntary 
patient” as a person receiving care and treatment in an approved centre who is not the subject of 
29 Storck v Germany (61603/00) [2005] ECHR 406  
30 ‘... assuming that the applicant was no longer capable of consenting following her treatment with 
strong medication, she cannot in any event be considered to have validly agreed’, ibid., para 76. 
31 M. Donnelly Healthcare Decision Making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of 
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p220. 
32 Shtukaturov v. Russia (44009/05) [2008] ECHR 223 
33 Ibid., para 108. ‘Capacity and incapacity are not concepts with clear a priori boundaries. They 
appear on a continuum….There are, therefore, degrees of capacity’. M. Gunn, ‘The Meaning of 
Incapacity’ (1994) 2 Medical Law Review 8, at p9, as quoted in J. Herring, “Losing it, Losing What? 
The Law on Dementia” (2009) 21 Child and Family Law Quarterly 3, p 4. 
34 E.H. v Clinical Director of St Vincent’s Hospital [ 2009] I.E.H.C.69, E.H. v Clinical Director of St 
Vincent’s Hospital [2009] IESC 46 
35 It is worth recalling at this point the words of Denham J in In Re a Ward of Court [1996] 2 IR 79, at 
156, in relation to consent: ‘If medical treatment is given without consent it may be trespass against 
the person in civil law, a battery in criminal law, and a breach of the individual’s constitutional rights’ or 
indeed as Patricia Rickard-Clarke, of the Law Reform Commission, observes, voluntary ‘ has to mean 
consent to something, it can’t mean anything else’, ‘Mental Capacity in the context of the Mental 
Health Act 2001’, (2010) Mental Health Law Conference, Faculty of Law, U.C.C. ‘It had been 
submitted by the applicant’s legal team in the High Court and in the Supreme Court that the word 
“voluntary” must be given its ordinary meaning, “a meaning which respects the provisions of the 
Constitution and a meaning which, having regard to the State's obligations pursuant to s. 2(1) of the 
Human Rights Act 2003, respects the necessity for a freely given consent to detention by a person 
who has capacity to give it.’ A. Hynes, ‘The Mental Health Act 2001 in Practice’ (Mental Health Law 
Conference, U.C.C., 2010). 
41 
                                                 
[2016] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
an admission order or a renewal order. This definition cannot be given an interpretation which is 
contra legem.’36 
 
But probably more worrying is when Kearns J goes on to say: ‘Any interpretation of 
the term in the Act must be informed by the overall scheme and paternalistic intent of 
the legislation as exemplified by the provisions of sections 4 and 29 of the Act.’37 In 
so doing he fails to recognise that the 2001 Act was not intended to be a reiteration 
of the 1945 Act38 and that the ‘best interests’39 standard as set out in s4 is not 
merely medical best interests but that the need to respect ‘the right of the person to 
dignity, bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy’ is clearly stated.40 Indeed, as the Irish 
Human Rights Commission went on to observe, in its submission as amicus curiae41, 
in the later case of P.L. v Clinical Director of St Patrick’s University Hospital (No 2)42 
‘paternalism cannot be given such a broad application as to defeat the significant 
recognition given to the patient’s human rights, accorded by the Mental Health Act, 
2001’.43 If the friendly settlement agreed in Croke44 was the impetus behind the new 
legislation then surely it follows that the legislation was to bring Ireland in to line with 
the ECHR and the Winterwerp principles?45 Kearns J was clearly satisfied that the 
fact that the medical professionals were ‘poised to reinstate’ the involuntary order 
(and thereby the specific statutory protections) was sufficient to guard against 
36 Per Kearns J, EH v Clinical Director St Vincent’s Hospital [2009]2 I.L.R.M., 149, at 161. Donnelly 
calls it ‘a departure from common sense’ (M. Donnelly, ‘ “Voluntary” psychiatric patients need 
protection’ Irish Times, 9th of February 2012)., Additionally, as Craven observes, ‘Quite apart from 
any question of statutory interpretation, if the lex referred to includes, as it reasonably might, the 
general law on consent, the interpretation contended for cannot, as a result be considered to be 
contra legem. Such a restrictive approach might be considered contra corpus iuris’ (C. Craven, 
‘Issues of Consent –Detention & Treatment’ November 2010, The Law Society of Ireland p 11). 
37 Per Kearns J, EH v Clinical Director St Vincent’s Hospital [2009]2 I.L.R.M.,149, at 161.  
38The new Act is different. Eldergill, among others, observes: ‘[I]t must be emphasised that the main 
purpose of the 2001 legislation was patently not just to repeat the paternal character of the Act of 
1945. Nor was it intended simply to ensure the care and custody of people suffering from mental 
disorder. The 1945 Act promoted and secured those objectives’ (A. Eldergill, ‘The Best is the Enemy 
of The Good: The Mental Health Act 2001’ (2008) J. Mental Health L. 21, p23). 
39 ‘The inclusion of best interests in s.4 has provided a justification for the continuing reliance on 
paternalism as the guiding principle in Irish mental health law’ cautions Murray. C. Murray, ‘Moving 
Towards Rights-based Mental Health Law: The Limits of Legislative Reform’ (2013) 1 The Irish Jurist 
161, p175). 
40 S 4 (3) Mental Health Act 2001 
41 P.L. v Clinical Director of St Patrick’s University Hospital, Outline Submissions of the Human Rights 
Commission, (19th June, 2012).  
42 [2012] IEHC 547 
43 P.L. v Clinical Director of St Patrick’s University Hospital, Outline Submissions of the Human Rights 
Commission, 19th June, 2012, p20. ‘The MHA 2001 does contain a number of important safeguards 
and rights which had not previously existed in Ireland, such as automatic periodic review of detention 
by tribunals and second-opinion safeguards for certain invasive medical treatments’. C. Murray, 
‘Moving Towards Rights-based Mental Health Law: The Limits of Legislative Reform’, (2013) 1 The 
Irish Jurist 161, p166. 
44 Croke v Ireland (33267/96) [2000] ECHR 680 
45 ‘It is noted however, that in Croke v Smith (No 2) [1998] 1 IR 101 the Supreme Court held that, on 
the facts of that particular case, the Constitution did not require automatic review by an independent 
tribunal of the patient’s detention. However, it is submitted that the Oireachtas has now expressed a 
clear intention, that this would not be the case by enacting the Mental Health Act 2001.’ P.L. v Clinical 
Director of St Patrick’s University Hospital, Outline Submissions of the Human Rights Commission, 
19th June, 2012, para 50, p24. 
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arbitrary detention.46 This sounds like a reasoning similarly deferential to the medical 
profession to that given by the Supreme Court in Croke47 on the 1945 Act. It also 
‘glosses over the fact that from December 10 to 22, the protections were not 
available’48 and this is not as Craven observes ‘apparently reconcilable with the due 
process requirements of the Convention’.49  
 
In many ways E.H. was not an ideal test case to advance the rights of the voluntary 
patient. In E.H. it is fair to say that on the facts the patient may not have been 
‘arbitrarily’ deprived of her liberty, and since the purpose of the safeguards as set out 
in Winterwerp was to guard against ‘arbitrary’ detention there may have been less 
sympathy for the situation the applicant found herself in. Kearns J had a difficulty 
with her having capacity to instruct counsel and yet not to consent to admission. In 
addition, by the time the habeas corpus application came around the fact that the 
applicant was lawfully detained on an involuntary order ‘led the court to question 
whether the arguments before it were moot.’50 However since the applicant in E.H. 
was in a very similar position to H.L., being an informal patient without capacity, it 
seems odd not to consider H.L as of precedential value.51 A fundamental difficulty in 
the E.H. case, in common with the case we now move on to consider, P.L.,52 is that 
in neither case was there a suggestion that the applicant was well enough to be 
discharged and for that reason the Court may have been looking in a paternalistic 
way to find that the detention was lawful so that treatment might be continued.53  
 
C. P.L. v Clinical Director of St Patrick’s University Hospital.54 
 
In P.L. the applicant sought declarations that ‘the respondents were not entitled to 
prevent him from leaving the hospital without involuntarily admitting him in 
accordance with the MHA 2001’.55  
46 Any deprivation of liberty should be consistent with the purpose of Article 5, namely to protect 
individuals from arbitrariness. See Herczegfalvy v Austria (1992) 15 EHRR. 
47 When it extinguished the trail blazed by Budd J in the High Court. D. Whelan, Mental Health Law 
and Practice: Civil and Criminal Aspects (Dublin: Round Hall 2009), p7. 
48 ‘This reasoning glosses over the fact that from 10 to 22 December, protections against arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty were not available’ D. Whelan, ‘Can the Right to Personal Liberty be Interpreted 
in a Paternalistic Manner?: Cases on the Mental Health Act 2001’, forthcoming, (2012-2013) Irish 
Human Rights Law Review, p17 of 20.  
49 C. Craven, ‘Issues of Consent –Detention & Treatment’ November 2010, The Law Society of 
Ireland, p 13 of 31.  
50 C. Murray, ‘Moving Towards Rights-based Mental Health Law: The Limits of Legislative Reform’ 
(2013) 1 The Irish Jurist 161, p 173  
51 D. Whelan, Mental Health Law and Practice: Civil and Criminal Aspects (Dublin: Round Hall 2009) 
p167, M. Donnelly, Falling between the gaps: Formulating reform in a dual-model system. 23 June 
2012, Mental Health Law Reform: New Perspectives and Challenges (Amnesty International Ireland 
and the Centre for Disability Law and Policy, NUIG, and C. Murray, ‘Moving Towards Rights-based 
Mental Health Law: The Limits of Legislative Reform’ (2013) 1 The Irish Jurist 161, p 171. 
52 P.L. v Clinical Director of St Patrick’s University Hospital [2012] IEHC 15 
53 As Murray observes: ‘The practical effectiveness of the rights protections contained in the MHA 
2001 depends to a significant extent on the judicial approach taken to their implementation.’ C Murray 
’Reinforcing Paternalism within Irish Mental Health Law - Contrasting the Decisions in EH v St. 
Vincent’s Hospital and Others and SM v The Mental Health Commission and Others’ (2010) 17 Dublin 
University Law Journal 273, p273. 
54 [2012] IEHC 15 
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The case is as complete an illustration of the myriad difficulties encountered in 
attempting to treat a voluntary patient while staying on the right side of the legal 
regime as we are likely to get: 
 
‘Mr McDonagh for the applicant does not dispute that the applicant is suffering from a mental 
illness for which he needs care and treatment. At issue, rather, is whether there is any lawful 
basis for the applicant’s de facto detention in the hospital, in circumstances where on the 12th 
October 2011 the Renewal Order was revoked and the applicant was “discharged” though not 
permitted to leave, where he initially thereafter agreed to remain and be treated as a voluntary 
patient, but has on several occasions thereafter expressed a wish, and has in fact attempted, to 
leave the hospital, has verbally indicated a withdrawal of his consent to remain as a voluntary 
patient, has been physically restrained from attempting to leave and forcibly sedated, but has 
not been detained pursuant to the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act because he was 
not considered by Dr. Power to be a person who fulfilled the criteria for admission under those 
sections.’ 56 
 
Proceeding to analyse that argument piece by piece we might comment as follows: If 
the applicant needs treatment then that is arguably in his ‘best interests’ pursuant to 
s4 of the Act and so he could have been formally detained under the legislation. He 
expressed a wish to stay on without formal detention, which was acceded to and this 
acknowledges his ‘will and preference’.57 He then expressed a wish to leave. This 
wish is inconsistent with his earlier wish58 and could call in to question his capacity59, 
though no finding of incapacity could or would be made under the Act, such as would 
have had any impact on his status as a voluntary patient. He was forcibly 
restrained60 and sedated, which the Committee on the Prevention on Torture (CPT) 
have previously commented on, 61 , and ultimately the second opinion doctor 
55 C. Murray, ‘Moving Towards Rights-baed Mental Health Law: The Limits of Legislative Reform’, 
(2013) 1 The Irish Jurist 161, p173. The recent case of Atudorei v. Romania suggests ‘that the failure 
of the authorities to initiate the involuntary procedure for hospitalisation in the applicant’s case 
underlines the uncertainty and ambiguity of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty’ and as being capable 
of engaging Article 5(1) of the ECHR. Atudorei v. Romania (50131/08) (2014) ECHR 947, para 147. 
56 P.L. v Clinical Director of St Patrick’s University Hospital [2012] IEHC 15, at 30. 
57 This is the language of Article 12 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Equal 
recognition before the law). 
58 ‘Psychotic patients may often have no unitary "will" as the law conceives it, but rather fluctuate back 
and forth between mutually exclusive desires, unable to resolve conflicting wishes’. P.Appelbaum and 
G.Gutheil "Rotting With Their Rights On": Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal 
by Psychiatric Patients. Bulletin of the AAPL Vol. VII, No.3, p313. 
59  As Dworkin argues ‘[I]f [a person’s] choices and demands, no matter how firmly expressed, 
systematically or randomly contradict one another, reflecting no coherent sense of self and no 
discernible even short-term aims, then he has presumably lost that capacity that is the point of 
autonomy to protect.’ R.Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and 
Individual Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) p 224 
60 Although this is expressly permitted for voluntary patients under s 69 (4)(b) of the 2001 Act 
provided that the Rules Governing the Use of Seclusion and Mechanical Means of Bodily Restraint 
(The Mental Health Commission, October 2009) have been complied with. 
61 The administration of medication ‘for behaviour control rather than for decreasing symptoms of  
their disease’ has been criticised by the CPT: ‘At present, such use of “chemical restraint” does not 
qualify as a means of restraint under Irish law and is therefore not subjected to oversight. The CPT 
recommends that use of “chemical restraint” be governed by clear rules and subjected to the same 
oversight as regards other means of restraint.’ Report to the Government of Ireland on the visit to 
Ireland carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman of 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment(CPT) from 25 January to 5 February 2010, Strasbourg, 10 
February 2011, para 132, p65. 
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disagreed with his treating psychiatrist as to the necessity of formal detention. 
Arguably therefore he had an ‘independent review’ of his detention. It appears as 
Murray has noted ‘that the reason the renewal order was revoked was that the 
treating consultant psychiatrist was of the opinion that the applicant was improving’62 
and this is part of what moving from involuntary to voluntary status is about. 
 
Peart J, in P.L., highlights, while ultimately determining that the applicant’s detention 
was lawful in the particular case, that the danger is that:  
 
‘[F]or all practical purposes the applicant in the present case is in precisely the same 
locked ward and under precisely the same care and treatment plan63 which he was 
under while the subject of the Renewal Order prior to its revocation. He is not permitted 
to leave the hospital when he expresses a wish to do so, yet he has none of the 
protections and safeguards of an involuntary patient. His status as a voluntary patient 
appears to disadvantage him in this way and arguably gives rise to the mischief that he 
could remain indefinitely in this locked ward as a “voluntary patient” with no recourse to 
review or even access to a legal representative to assist him…’64  
  
Peart J effectively acknowledges the rights issues but finds, indeed as he did in 
M.McN. v HSE65 that he cannot bring himself to have a vulnerable person potentially 
released unprotected,66 finding instead that: 
 
‘a wide margin of appreciation67 ought to be allowed to clinicians when faced with a patient who 
expresses a wish to leave, to not immediately permit him to do so, in order to provide an 
opportunity to discuss matters with him with a view to persuading him to once again co-operate 
as a voluntary patient in his own best interests, rather than simply accepting the expressed 
wish at face value immediately, and discharging him there and then.’68 
 
However, as the 2008 Annual Report of the Mental Health Commission pointedly 
identifies:  
 
62 C. Murray, ‘Moving Towards Rights-based Mental Health Law: The Limits of Legislative Reform’, 
(2013) 1 The Irish Jurist 161, p174. 
63  ‘In reality, the difference between her position and that of a hypothetical detained psychiatric 
patient….would have been one of form, not substance.’ As Lord Dyson JSC observed in Rabone v 
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust [2012] UKSC 2 at paragraph 34. 
64 P.L. v Clinical Director of St Patrick’s University Hospital (No.1) [2012] IEHC 15, at 48 .He does 
however say that the regulation of treatment for voluntary patients might benefit from being addressed 
by the Supreme Court. See M. Carolan, ‘Voluntary mental patient not being held unlawfully’ Irish 
Times, 25th January, 2012. 
65 M. McN v Health Service Executive [2009] IEHC 236, High Court, Peart J, May 15, 2009. 
66  ‘ [I]t would be grossly negligent for the hospital, following the required revocation of the 
admission/renewal order, to immediately bring these vulnerable patients to the front door of the 
hospital, lead them down the steps and to pavement and say to them ‘we no longer have any legal 
basis for keeping you in hospital, so off you go – home or wherever you can’….’ M.McN v Health 
Service Executive [2009] IEHC 236, High Court, Peart J, May 15, 2009, p 37.Contrast this however 
with Clarke J in JH v Russell [2007] IEHC 7, at 6.5: ‘While I fully understand the pressures which may 
have led those in charge of Mr H to attempt to devise means of ensuring his continued treatment, 
(which they clearly considered desirable) notwithstanding the defective legislation within which they 
were operating, I was nonetheless satisfied that the detention was unlawful’  
67 The Court recalls that in deciding whether an individual should be detained as a “person of unsound 
mind”, the national authorities are to be recognised as having a certain margin of appreciation. 
Shtukaturov v Russia (44009/05) ECHR 223, para 67 
68 P.L. v Clinical Director of St Patrick’s University Hospital [2012] IEHC 15, at 50. 
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‘It is a fact of life that when individuals, especially vulnerable individuals, are detained, an 
imbalance of power exists between those detained and those holding the keys. Without 
rigorous human rights standards and frequent inspections, this is fertile ground for abuse or 
neglect’.69  
 
In S.M. v the Mental Health Commission and Ors,70 McMahon J while observing that 
‘such statutory provisions which attempt to detain a person or restrict his or her 
liberty must be narrowly construed’, ordered a stay of four weeks to allow the 
“relevant authorities” to determine what the appropriate order was in the 
circumstances. 71  Whelan notes that this appears to be ‘an unjustifiably lengthy 
period of time to postpone the release of a patient in unlawful custody.’ 72  The 
problem, as Lady Hale, or Hoggett (as she then was), has observed is that you can 
only secure your release in to the community if appropriate supports are there.73 
There has not been the progress in setting up community support that would have 
been envisaged by, inter alia, A Vision for Change74 with the result that ‘patients 
continue to be readmitted on an inpatient basis when they could be more 
appropriately treated in the community.’ 75  This may in part be influencing the 
judiciary’s cautious attitude or continuing paternalism in respect of a patient’s 
detention. However, it is hard to disagree with Murray’s conclusion in P.L., that it is 
‘an extraordinary interpretation of the MHA 2001’ to find that a ‘capable, unwilling 
“voluntary” patient who was refused permission to leave the hospital, with no 
possibility of an independent procedure to review the ongoing need for him to remain 
in the hospital’ was ‘not unlawfully detained or deprived of his liberty’.76 
 
The fact that fewer people are now being treated on an involuntary basis is 
suggestive of co-operation in treatment 77  rather than compulsion but if it is 
unregulated it may be voluntary in name only. One cannot help but feel that 
voluntary patients now are in an eerily similar position to involuntary patients under 
the 1945 Act where ‘[t]here was no mechanism for an automatic review of the 
decision to admit, for example, and once admitted, a patient’s stay could be renewed 
indefinitely at the discretion of the person in charge of the institution, without the 





69 Mental Health Commission Annual Report 2008 (Mental Health Commission, 2009) p57. 
70 S.M. v The Mental Health Commission, the Mental Health Tribunal and the Clinical Director of St. 
Patrick's Hospital [2009] 3 IR 188 
71 Ibid., at 203 
72 D.Whelan, Mental Health Law and Practice: Civil and Criminal Aspects (Dublin: Round Hall 2009), 
p 40. 
73 B.Hoggett, Mental Health Law (London 1976).  
74 Expert Group on Mental Health Policy, A Vision for Change (Dublin, 2006). 
75Mental Health Research Unit of Health Research Board, Selected Findings and Policy Implications 
from 10 Years of HRB Mental Health Research, 2009, p8. 
76 C. Murray, ‘Moving Towards Rights-based Mental Health Law: The Limits of Legislative Reform’, 
(2013) 1 The Irish Jurist 161, p174 
77 Though it looks like, to borrow an expression from the medical world this might be a false positive. 
78 P. Casey, P. Brady, C. Craven and A. Dillon, Psychiatry and the Law, 2nd ed. (Dublin: Blackhall 
Publishing, 2010), p437. 
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V. CASE LAW IN RELATION TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT 
 
There is as yet little Irish case law in relation to consent to treatment.79 As Lady 
Hale, of the UK Supreme Court, observed previously ‘[t]he Bournewood 
amendments80 deal only with safeguards against arbitrary deprivation of liberty. They 
do not introduce safeguards against unjustified medical treatment.’81 Consent can be 
complicated in a physical health scenario82 but the case of M v Ukraine83 suggests 
that E.H. for instance would certainly fall foul of what the ECtHR would expect in 
terms of a valid consent to treatment for a mental health patient: 
 
‘[T]he Court takes the view that a person’s consent to admission to a mental health facility for 
in-patient treatment can be regarded as valid for the purpose of the Convention only where 
there is sufficient and reliable evidence suggesting that the person’s mental ability to consent 
and comprehend the consequences thereof has been objectively established in the course of a 
fair and proper procedure and that all the necessary information concerning placement and 
intended treatment has been adequately provided to him’.84 
 
This issue has been addressed by the Expert Group on the Review of the Mental 
Health Act 2001 in their Report in which they recommend that: 
 
‘[a]ll voluntary patients on admission to an approved centre should be fully informed of their 
rights, including information relating to their proposed treatment as well as their rights regarding 
consent or refusal of treatment and their right to leave the approved centre at any time.’85  
 
It was held in Storck v Germany86 that ‘even a minor interference with the physical 
integrity of an individual must be regarded as an interference with the right to respect 
for private life under Article 8 if it is carried out against the individual’s will.’87 Indeed 
as the Committee on the Prevention of Torture observed:  
 
The CPT’s mandate relates to persons deprived of their liberty, and not to voluntary patients. 
However, in the course of the visit, the CPT’s delegation observed that many so-called 
“voluntary” patients were in reality deprived of their liberty; they were accommodated in closed 
units from which they were not allowed to leave and, in at least certain cases, were returned to 
the hospital if they left without permission. Further, if staff considered it necessary, these 
patients could also be subjected to seclusion and could be administered medication for 
prolonged periods against their wish.88  
79 K.C. v Clinical Director of St Loman’s Hospital [2013] IEHC 310, High Court, Hogan J., July 4, 2013; 
Health Service Executive v M.X. [2011] I.E.H.C. 326,High Court, MacMenamin J., July 29, 2011; M.X. 
v Health Service Executive [2012] I.E.H.C. 491 High Court, MacMenamin J., November 23, 2012 
(Source: Mental Health Commission Case Law Summary October 2013). It is worth noting that this 
also a problem for involuntary patients. 
80 Deprivation of Liberty Regulations, Introduced in to Mental Capacity Act 2005 via s 50 of the Mental 
Health Act 2007 
81 B. Hale, ‘The Human Rights Act and Mental Health Law: Has it Helped?’ (2007) J. Mental Health L. 
7, p 11 
82 See D. Madden, Medicine Ethics and the Law, 2nd Ed (Bloomsbury, 2011) 
83 M v. Ukraine, (2452/04) 19th April, 2012 
84 M v. Ukraine (2452/04) 19th April, 2012, para 77 
85 Department of Health, Report of the Steering Group on the Review of the Mental Health Act 2001, 
5th of March 2015, Recommendation 25, p 90. 
86 Storck v Germany (61603/00) [2005] ECHR 406 
87 Ibid., para 143. 
88 Report to the Government of Ireland on the visit to Ireland carried out by the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman of Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 25 
January to 5 February 2010, Strasbourg, 10 February 2011 para 117, p65. 
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A. MX v HSE89  
 
In the 2012 case of M.X, MacMenamin J stated: ‘By virtue of ss. 2-5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, this court is required to interpret laws of this 
State in compliance with the State’s obligation under the ECHR provisions’.90 He had 
noted that ‘[t]he incursion into the plaintiff’s constitutional rights is very significant. It 
involves medical treatment against her will.’ 91  While he acknowledged that the 
paternalistic nature of Act had been emphasised in cases such as E.H, he 
considered that this case was different as it was about treatment rather than liberty.92 
If the reasons for drawing a distinction between liberty and consent to treatment 
were not entirely clear, the case itself was a welcome acknowledgment of the 
relevance of international human rights principles. In the Grand Chamber judgment 
Stanev v. Bulgaria 93 judgment the ECtHR stated that it felt ‘obliged to note the 
growing importance which international instruments for the protection of people with 
mental disorders are now attaching to granting them as much legal autonomy as 
possible.’94 MacMenamin J found in M.X95 that there was no space on the relevant 
form, Form 17,96 to record the patient’s view on medication and his ruling in this 
regard has led to Form 17 being changed. It may seem a small change but it is very 
important as an example of the recognition of the right of a patient to be heard. As 
Bartlett asks: ‘[C]an we afford to have the process independent of the voices of the 
very people the service affects?’97 and, as Murray observes,‘[a]t the heart of the 
CRPD is a commitment to positive rights, and this introduces a new perspective on 
discussions of rights-based mental health law.’98  
 
B. K.C. v Clinical Director of St Loman’s Hospital99  
 
The recent case of K.C. continues the paternalistic vein. In that case Hogan J ruled 
that the provisions of s. 23 (and, by extension, s. 24) which enable a holding power 
to prevent a voluntary patient from attempting to leave, pending examination by an 
independent Consultant Psychiatrist, do not ‘impliedly prevent the making of an 
admission order’100 when they do not attempt to leave. 
 
K.C. is a very important case in terms of treatment as it reveals the practical 
difficulties when a voluntary patient does not attempt to leave but does not consent 
89 M.X. v Health Service Executive [2012] IEHC 491 
90 Ibid., para 61 
91 Ibid., para 5 
92 Ibid., para 59  
93 Stanev v. Bulgaria (36760/06) [2012] ECHR 46 
94 ibid., at para 244 
95 M.X. v Health Service Executive [2012] IEHC 491, at para 28 
96 Form 17, Mental Health Act 2001 s 60. Treatment without consent, administration of medicine for 
more than 3 months, involuntary patient. 
97 P.Bartlett and R. Sandland, Mental Health Law: Policy and Practice, 4th Ed., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), p 2. 
98 C. Murray, ‘Moving Towards Rights-based Mental Health Law: The Limits of Legislative Reform’, 
(2013) 1 The Irish Jurist 161, p 161. 
99 K.C. v Clinical Director of St Loman’s Hospital [2013] IEHC 310 
100 Ibid., para 21. Anecdotally there was some disquiet among tribunal members as to whether that 
was the intended interpretation of the section. 
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to any treatment. This is why the Expert Group on the review of the Mental Health 
Act believe that consent to admission should include some understanding that you 
are consenting to being admitted for treatment101 and that if that acceptance were 
not forthcoming that the admission would not proceed.102 The Canadian case of 
Starson v Swayze,103 although it concerns an involuntary patient is a salutary lesson. 
In that case, Professor Starson refused medication and his health eventually 
declined to a point where he lost capacity, was eventually treated and improved, but 




Case law in relation to the voluntary patient is only in its infancy in Ireland. The cases 
have only begun to come before the courts since about 2008, two years after the 
operative date of the Mental Health Act 2001. Prior to that, a great deal of the case 
law in relation to detention came from cases against the Central Mental Hospital 
(‘CMH’), which is the national forensic psychiatric unit.104 The reason for this was 
that patients in the CMH would already have had legal representation from their legal 
cases and there is a well-established ‘rights culture’ in prison105 and by extension in 
the CMH. While the rights protections may be slow in filtering through for the wider 
community of detained patients it is immensely welcome that an avenue has been 
presented, via the introduction of automatic legal representation for involuntary 
patients in the 2001 Act. 106  While the overriding approach of the judiciary is 
undoubtedly paternalistic it is very welcome that the rights issues are beginning to be 
aired before the courts and that a greater awareness is being created of the issues 
involved. With the advocacy brought about by the 2001 Act we have found that very 
many people were unlawfully detained under the 1945 Act.107 Unfortunately as legal 
representation is only available to involuntary patients the cases that come before 
the courts tend to be people who are essentially very unwell and while judges, such 
as Peart J and MacMenamin J, recognise the existence of their rights they tend 
ultimately to fall back on a paternalistic default setting. Perhaps if representation or 
101 ‘It was submitted that a voluntary patient who might meet the 23 criteria for a mental disorder could 
withhold consent to treatment and consequently their condition might deteriorate yet their status 
cannot be changed unless they indicate a wish to leave the approved centre’. Department of Health, 
Interim Report of the Steering Group on the Review of the Mental Health Act 2001, 27th of April 2012, 
p23. In their Final Report, the Expert Group recommend ‘that it should no longer be a requirement 
that a patient must first indicate a wish to leave the approved centre before the involuntary admission 
process is initiated.’ Report of the Expert Group on the Review of the Mental Health Act 2001, (2015), 
p56. 
102 Which is more like the 1945 Act. 
103 Starson v Swayze [2003] SCC 32 
104 Re Philip Clarke [1950] IR 235, R.T. v. The Director of the Central Mental Hospital [1995] 2 IR 65, 
Croke v Smith (No 2))[1998] 1 IR 101. 
105 Many factors might be at play in the apparent low rate of use of the habeas corpus procedure, 
including the lack of information about rights, or the lack of a “rights culture” in psychiatric hospitals. 
Keys, M ‘Challenging the lawfulness of psychiatric detention under habeas corpus in Ireland’ (2002) 
24 D.U.L.J. 26. 
106 S 16(2) (b) 
107 A. Hynes, ‘The Mental Health Act 2001 in Practice’ Mental Health Law Conference February 26 
2010. U.C.C. 
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advocacy were available to voluntary patients108 it might be easier to establish a 
more general application of rights protection.109 This could be singularly useful in 
relation to consent to treatment which has not as yet been considered by the Irish 
courts to any substantial degree. 
108 The case law concerning voluntary patients tends - E.H. and P.L. being examples - to concern 
patients who had been involuntary and had therefore been assigned a legal representative who 
continued to act for them notwithstanding that they had become voluntary patients. 
109 ‘This can be contrasted with the approach in the context of challenges to detention in excess of 
time limits contained in criminal justice legislation. In these circumstances the courts are more 
disposed to find that there has been a breach of the fundamental rights of the party detained.’ C. 
Murray, “Reinforcing Paternalism within Irish Mental Health Law - Contrasting the Decisions in EH v 
St. Vincent’s Hospital and Others and SM v The Mental Health Commission and Others” (2010) 17 
Dublin University Law Journal 273, p273. 
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